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INTRODUCTION
This year in review discusses many of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit’s most important 2019 government contract decisions,
explaining their impact on the overall trajectory of procurement law. In
2019, as usual, government contracts appeals occupied only a small
fraction of the Federal Circuit’s docket, which was dominated by
intellectual property disputes.1 Yet, the few government contract
decisions the Federal Circuit did issue in 2019 carry great consequence.
It remains important for procurement practitioners to keep a careful
eye on the Federal Circuit’s government contracts docket and decisions,
not only to stay informed of developments in the law but also to

1. Appeals Filed, by Category, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.
uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/the-court/statistics/04_-_Appeal_Filed_by_Category
_2019_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VSH-2EHC].
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understand how the Federal Circuit decides government contracts
appeals and better anticipate where the law may turn next.2
I. DISCUSSION: THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S 2019 GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTS DECISIONS
A. Cost & Pricing
The Federal Circuit issued two precedential decisions in 2019
addressing significant issues of government contract cost, pricing, and
accounting. Raytheon Co. v. Secretary of Defense3 disrupts prior
understandings of the differences between costs that are unallowable
and costs that are expressly unallowable.4 Bechtel National, Inc. v. United
States5 confirms that contractor recovery of litigation settlement costs
will continue to be governed by the strict rule established by the
controversial 2009 decision Geren v. Tecom.6
1.

Raytheon: Broadening the scope of expressly unallowable costs
The Raytheon decision involved the difference between costs that are
unallowable and costs that are expressly unallowable. By finding that
certain salary costs “associated with” lobbying were expressly
unallowable—as opposed to unallowable—the Federal Circuit departed
from the express definitional distinction between unallowable costs and
expressly unallowable costs, creating uncertainty as to how other types
of unallowable costs will be categorized moving forward.7
a. Context
The Federal Acquisition Regulation’s (FAR) Part 31 Cost Principles
identifies forty-six categories of costs and addresses the extent to which
those costs are unallowable.8 Although many types of costs may be
unallowable, a smaller subset of costs are expressly unallowable. The
government will not reimburse unallowable costs, which must be
2. See generally The Hon. Jimmie V. Reyna & Nathaniel E. Castellano, Successful
Advocacy in Government Contracts Appeals Before the Federal Circuit: Context Is Key, 46 PUB.
CONT. L.J. 209 (2016).
3. 940 F.3d 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
4. Id. at 1310, 1314.
5. 929 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
6. 566 F.3d 1037 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 929 F.3d at 1377, 1381.
7. See Paul E. Pompeo & Nathaniel E. Castellano, Federal Circuit Disrupts Law of Expressly
Unallowable Costs, GOV’T CONT. COST, PRICING & ACCT. REP., Dec. 2019, at 1, 1–3.
8. See generally 48 C.F.R. pt. 31 (2018).
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identified and excluded from any billing, claim, or proposal applicable
to a government contract.9 With respect to expressly unallowable costs,
however, contractors are further subject to penalty if they submit to the
government any expressly unallowable cost.10
Expressly unallowable costs are distinguished from unallowable costs
by definition. The definition of expressly unallowable costs requires a
heightened degree of particularity. An expressly unallowable cost is
defined as a “particular item or type of cost which, under the express
provisions of an applicable law, regulation, or contract, is specifically
named and stated to be unallowable.”11 This requirement for heightened
specificity that a cost is unallowable before it becomes expressly
unallowable makes sense: it is one thing for the government to limit its
obligation to reimburse contractors for certain categories of costs, but
it is a step further to affirmatively penalize a contractor for including a
specific item of cost in its invoices.
Raytheon involved certain salary costs associated with lobbying
activities. Implementing statutory provisions,12 FAR section 31.205-22
designates as unallowable costs “associated with” various lobbying and
political activities.13 Affirming the contracting officer’s underlying
decision, the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA)
found that the lobbying costs at issue were subject to penalty because
“[c]osts associated with certain named lobbying activities are stated to
be unallowable under FAR 31.205-22,” and “they are [thus] expressly
unallowable.”14 Raytheon appealed. The narrow question presented to
the Federal Circuit was whether salary costs “associated with” employees
engaging in lobbying activity qualify as expressly unallowable costs.
b. The Federal Circuit’s decision
The Federal Circuit affirmed the ASBCA decision by a unanimous
opinion authored by Judge Dyk and joined by Judges Linn and
Taranto.15 Even though FAR 31.205-22 does not expressly name and

9. See generally 1 KAREN L. MANOS, GOVERNMENT CONTRACT COST & PRICING § 7:12,
Westlaw (June 2019 update).
10. 48 C.F.R. § 42.709-1(a)(1) (2018).
11. 48 C.F.R. § 31.0001 (2018) (emphasis added).
12. 10 U.S.C. § 2324(e)(B) (2018).
13. 48 C.F.R. § 31.205-22(a).
14. Raytheon Co., ASBCA No. 57743, 17-1 BCA ¶ 36,724.
15. Raytheon Co. v. Sec’y of Def., 940 F.3d 1310, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
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state salary or compensation as unallowable, the Federal Circuit
nevertheless held that such salary costs are expressly unallowable:
The definition in FAR § 31.001 of an “expressly unallowable cost”
refers to “a particular item or type of cost.” These two categories of
costs confirm that an “expressly unallowable” cost includes more than
an explicitly stated “item.” Costs unambiguously falling within a
generic definition of a “type” of unallowable cost are also “expressly
unallowable.” Here, salaries of in-house lobbyists are a prototypical
lobbying expense. Subsection 22 disallows “costs associated with”
activities such as “attempt[ing] to influence . . . legislation . . . through
communication with any member or employee of the . . . legislature”
or “attend[ing] . . . legislative sessions or committee hearings.”
Salaries of corporate personnel involved in lobbying are
unambiguously “costs associated with” lobbying.16

In dicta, the Federal Circuit rejected in part prior ASBCA precedent
that reached the opposite conclusion.17 The Board’s prior decision,
also involving an appeal by Raytheon, concluded that bonus and
incentive compensation costs are not expressly unallowable under FAR
31.205-22 because the costs were not specifically named and stated in
the cost principle, i.e., the “associated with” language, was not sufficient
to invoke the standard of expressly unallowable costs and the resultant
penalty.18 The Federal Circuit was not persuaded: “That decision is not
binding on this court, and in any event, is contrary to the plain
language of Subsection 22 to the extent that it concludes that salaries
in the form of bonus and incentive compensation for lobbying and
political activities are not ‘expressly unallowable.’”19
c. Implications
The Federal Circuit’s decision blurs the definitional distinction
between unallowable and expressly unallowable costs. Whereas the
FAR defines expressly unallowable costs as those “specifically named
and stated to be unallowable,” the Federal Circuit seems to have
adopted a broader test that encompasses “[c]osts unambiguously falling
within a generic definition of a ‘type’” deemed unallowable.20 Now,
instead of asking which types of costs are specifically named and stated

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 1313 (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 1314.
Raytheon Co., ASBCA No. 57576, 15-1 BCA ¶ 36043.
Raytheon, 940 F.3d at 1314.
Id. at 1312, 1313 (quoting 48 C.F.R. § 31.001 (2018)).
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as unallowable, contractors and government personnel must discern
what types of cost unambiguously fall within generic definitions of
types of unallowable costs.
The Federal Circuit’s reasoning could impact other cost principles
that speak in terms of costs “associated with” a particular activity. FAR
31.205-1, for example, speaks to the allowability of public relations
activities “associated with areas such as advertising, customer relations,
etc.”21 FAR 31.205-27 speaks to “expenditures in connection with”
business organization costs.22 The Federal Circuit’s holding in Raytheon
should be understood as limited to the issue of lobbying costs under
FAR 31.205-22; indeed, the Federal Circuit’s conclusion seems
inherently tied to its understanding of the relationship between
lobbying and lobbyists: “salaries of in-house lobbyists are a prototypical
lobbying expense.”23 However, government auditors will likely rely on
the reasoning of the Raytheon decision to find a broader range of costs
to be expressly unallowable.
2.

Bechtel: Reaffirming Tecom
The Bechtel appeal invited the Federal Circuit to cabin and clarify its
controversial Tecom decision, which established the general
(government-friendly) rule governing the ability of contractors to
recover litigation and settlement costs associated with government
contracts.24 The Federal Circuit, however, declined the invitation to
cabin Tecom; and to the extent Bechtel clarifies anything, it is that the
Tecom standard is here to stay.
a. Context
Prior to 2009, contractors were often able to recover from the
government third party litigation costs, including those associated with
cases involving alleged employment discrimination, which were
21. 48 C.F.R. § 31.205-1(a)(2) (2018).
22. § 31.205-27.
23. Raytheon, 940 F.3d at 1313.
24. Geren v. Tecom, Inc., 566 F.3d 1037, 1039 (Fed. Cir. 2009). For (critical)
analysis, see, for example, Steven L. Briggerman, Allowability of Legal Costs: Settlement of
Third-Party Litigation, 23 NO. 9 NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶ 50, Sept. 2009, at 1, 4; Richard C.
Johnson, Beyond Judicial Activism: Federal Circuit Decisions Legislating New Contract
Requirements, 42 PUB. CONT. L.J. 69, 82–86 (2012); John S. Pachter, The Incredible
Shrinking Contracting Officer, 39 PUB. CONT. L.J. 705, 736–38 (2010); Edward R. Brown,
Note, Not a Tecom Party: There’s “Very Little Likelihood” Geren v. Tecom Will Promote
Sound Government Contracting Practices, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 193 (2010).
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generally viewed as a cost of doing business.25 The Federal Circuit shifted
that presumption in the 2009 Tecom decision.26 Tecom involved the costs of
settling and defending a lawsuit alleging employment discrimination
where the contract at issue incorporated the clause at FAR 52.222-26,
“Equal Opportunity,” prohibiting employment discrimination.27 The
Federal Circuit reasoned that because an adverse judgment in the
employment discrimination lawsuit that the contractor had violated Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 would breach the underlying contract,
the costs of defending and settling such a lawsuit were unallowable—
unless the contracting officer determined that the Title VII plaintiff had
“very little likelihood of success on the merits.”28
The Bechtel case involved allowability of costs associated with two
discrimination lawsuits brought by former employees on a contract
that included FAR 52.222-26, “Equal Opportunity.”29 The contracting
officer reviewed the claims and issued a final decision disallowing the
contractor’s costs associated with defending the cases, citing Tecom.30
The contractor appealed, arguing that because the underlying
contract included a specific Department of Energy Acquisition
Regulation (DEAR) provision addressing allowability of litigation
costs, the Tecom standard should not apply. Specifically, Bechtel
invoked the qualifying language from Tecom suggesting that it only
applies “where neither the contract nor the FAR dictates the treatment

25. See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Corp., ASBCA No. 49372, 02-2 BCA ¶ 30,665
(“Nevertheless, the expenses incurred by a party in litigation are recognized costs of
doing business and the cost principles promulgated by the Government over the years
have uniformly recognized the allowability of contractor legal fees, within certain
parameters.”); Hirsch Tyler Co., ASBCA No. 20962, 76-2 BCA ¶ 12,075 (“[W]e
conclude that an ordinarily prudent person in the conduct of competitive business is
often obliged to defend lawsuits brought by third-parties, some of which are frivolous
and others of which have merit. In either event, the restraints or requirements
imposed by generally-accepted sound business practices dictate that, except under the
most extraordinary circumstances, a prudent businessman would incur legal expenses
to defend a litigation and that such expenses are of the type generally recognized as
ordinary and necessary for the conduct of a competitive business.”).
26. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 24, at 85.
27. Tecom, 566 F.3d at 1039.
28. Id. at 1043–46.
29. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc. v. United States, 929 F.3d 1375, 1377–79 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
30. Id. at 1377.
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of specific costs . . . .”31 Court of Federal Claims Judge Kaplan rejected
this argument, finding the settlement costs unallowable under Tecom.32
b. The Federal Circuit’s decision
Bechtel appealed to the Federal Circuit, arguing primarily that the
DEAR clause in the contract at issue rendered the Tecom standard
inapplicable. Bechtel argued that the regulatory history of the DEAR
clause and the parties’ prior course of conduct showed that the
Department of Energy (DOE) intended to assume the risk of reimbursing
costs associated with defending against third party claims.33 Bechtel
further argued that, in the event the Tecom standard did apply, the Federal
Circuit should revisit Tecom en banc to clarify the scope of its holding.34
The Federal Circuit affirmed by a unanimous, precedential opinion
authored by Judge Dyk (who also authored the majority Tecom
opinion) and joined by Judges Newman and Shall.35 The Federal Circuit
did not completely close the door to Bechtel’s theory, acknowledging
that: “Tecom recognized that the analysis for determining whether the
costs are allowable could change if there was a contract provision
‘dictat[ing] the treatment of specific costs.’”36 The Federal Circuit
concluded, however, that the DEAR provision at issue in this case did not
qualify.37 The Federal Circuit reasoned that while the DEAR clause
“generally provides for reimbursement,” it does so only “subject to certain
exceptions,” including where other provisions of the contract disallow the
costs in question.38 Because the same FAR clauses at issue in Tecom
appeared in the DOE contract at issue here, FAR 31.204 and 52.222-26,
they served to disallow the settlement costs, just as in Tecom.39
The panel concluded by recognizing that, as a prior precedential
decision, it is “bound by Tecom” and noted that the contractor “has not
demonstrated that Tecom is in any way unsound such that the panel should
recommend en banc review pursuant to Federal Circuit Rule 35.”40
31. Tecom, 566 F.3d at 1041.
32. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc. v. United States, 137 Fed. Cl. 423, 432 (2018).
33. Bechtel, 929 F.3d at 1379–81.
34. Id. at 1381.
35. Id. at 1376–77.
36. Id. at 1379 (quoting Tecom, 566 F.3d at 1041).
37. Id. at 1379.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1380 (“DEAR 970.5204-31 does not override the FAR provisions that we
interpreted in Tecom as disallowing those costs.”).
40. Id. at 1381.
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c. Implications
Bechtel reaffirms the Tecom standard and arguably narrows the
potential for contractors to sidestep Tecom by pointing to express
contract provisions and prior course of dealing indicating an agency’s
willingness to reimburse litigation expenses associated with defending
against third party claims. Open issues remain, in particular with respect
to how explicit a contract provision must be to avoid the Tecom standard.
The Bechtel decision is not encouraging to those hoping the Federal
Circuit might reign in Tecom. Unlike Tecom, which was a two-to-one
decision with a substantial and reasoned dissent from Judge Lourie,41
Bechtel is unanimous, and the opinion explicitly rejects the need for en
banc action.42 While the Bechtel panel’s explicit rejection of the need
for en banc review would not preclude a majority of active Federal
Circuit judges from voting to revisit Tecom en banc, at least three of the
twelve active judges would presumably vote against rehearing.43
Bechtel did not petition for en banc review.
B. CDA Jurisdiction: Three Sensible Resolutions, No Surprises
Many of the Federal Circuit’s most significant and controversial
government contracts decisions arise in the area of Contract Disputes
Act (CDA) jurisdiction. In the nearly fifty years since Congress enacted
the CDA to simplify breach of government contract disputes, the
Federal Circuit has riddled the CDA with jurisdictional traps that
disproportionately disadvantage contractor claims, often based on
trivial noncompliance with vague and unpredictable procedural
rules.44 Adding insult to injury, it follows clearly from the line of

41. Geren v. Tecom, Inc., 566 F.3d 1037, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Lourie, J., dissenting).
42. Bechtel, 929 F.3d at 1381.
43. See UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT INTERNAL
OPERATING PROCEDURES No. 13 (2008), http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/
files/IOPs122006.pdf [https://perma.cc/HX3V-J8J9].
44. See Nathaniel E. Castellano, After Arbaugh: Neither Claim Submission,
Certification, Nor Timely Appeal Are Jurisdictional Prerequisites to Contract Disputes Act
Litigation, 47 PUB. CONT. L.J. 35, 37 (2017) (“Despite congressional aspirations of
fairness and efficiency, decades of judicial and administrative interpretations left the
CDA riddled with unintuitive, subjective, and highly contextual procedural traps for
the unwary. Worse yet, the Federal Circuit and its predecessor (the U.S. Court of
Claims) labeled many of these procedural requirements as jurisdictional, allowing for
extraordinary disruptions to the dispute resolution process.” (footnote omitted));
Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, The Contract Disputes Act: A Prescription for Wheelspinning,
4 NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶ 29, May 1990.
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decisions beginning with the Supreme Court’s holding in Arbaugh v. Y
& H Corp.45 that the majority of the CDA’s procedural claim-processing
requirements carry no jurisdictional status.46 With that context, perhaps
the Federal Circuit’s 2019 government contracts decisions are worth
celebrating because the opinions addressing CDA jurisdiction reach
sensible conclusions, denying the government’s motions to dismiss.
Better still, DAI Global, LLC v. Administrator of the United States Agency
for International Development,47 issued in the final days of 2019, provides
a welcome step in the right direction towards simplifying the CDA’s
jurisdictional framework, particularly with respect to claim
certification. And although the DAI Global decision did not directly
engage with the broader argument that claim certification is not
jurisdictional, DAI Global does warrant cautious optimism that the
Federal Circuit may one day realign the CDA with Congress’s clear
intent and Supreme Court direction by demoting the CDA
requirements of claim submission, certification, and timely appeal from
their current, unjustified, jurisdictional status.
1.

DAI Global: Simplifying & relaxing claim certification
DAI Global properly rejects a line of decisions followed by the Boards of
Contract Appeals and some Court of Federal Claims judges holding that
they lack jurisdiction where a certification defect is “non-technical” or
“the failure properly to certify in the first instance was fraudulent, in bad
faith, or with reckless or grossly negligent disregard of the requirements
of the relevant statutes or regulations.”48 The Federal Circuit declined to
engage with the broader argument that the CDA certification
requirement is not jurisdictional. The DAI Global opinion, however,
conspicuously avoids any affirmative statement that the CDA certification
requirement is jurisdictional. Moreover, several nonprecedential remarks
from the Federal Circuit suggest the court is skeptical that certification
retains jurisdictional status following the 1992 CDA amendments.
Nevertheless, the Boards and some Court of Federal Claims judges treat

45. 546 U.S. 500 (2006).
46. Castellano, supra note 44, at 36 (“Applying the Supreme Court’s new bright-line
rule to other CDA requirements that have been traditionally classified as jurisdictional,
this article demonstrates that neither claim submission, certification, nor timely appeal
requirements are jurisdictional prerequisites to CDA litigation.”).
47. 945 F.3d 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
48. Id. at 1198 (quoting 138 CONG. REC. 21,033, 21,036 (1992)).
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lack of certification as a jurisdictional defect, continuing the need for the
Federal Circuit (or Congress) to weigh in.
a. Context for CDA certification
The CDA requires that contractor claims seeking more than
$100,000 must be accompanied by a certification that: (A) “the claim
is made in good faith”; (B) “the supporting data are accurate and
complete to the best of the contractor’s knowledge and belief”; (C)
“the amount requested accurately reflects the contract adjustment for
which the contractor believes the Federal Government is liable”; and
(D) the “certifier is authorized to certify the claim on behalf of the
contractor.”49 FAR 33.207(c) provides exact certification language.50
Early Federal Circuit precedent labeled the CDA certification
requirement as a jurisdictional prerequisite and established strict, but
often unpredictable, standards for certification. The result was a
consistent flood of motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction based on
purportedly inadequate certifications. Litigation of these fact-specific
procedural motions served to undermine the CDA’s purpose. As
professors Nash and Cibinic remarked in 1990:
There have been so many defective certification cases over the years
that they would make a veritable rogue’s gallery of wasted effort . . . .
I would guess that this has happened approximately 500 times since
the CDA was passed . . . . The result is mighty curious for an Act that
was passed to make the disputes process more efficient—and
certainly reveals a serious flaw in the CDA.51

Reflecting on her tenure at the Armed Services Board of Contract
Appeals, the Honorable Ruth C. Burg addressed the impact of
certification-related motions:
This plethora of motions was extremely frustrating since it impacted
not only a particular case where, if the certification was invalid, the
matter had to start all over, but also the entire docket. I still relive
the feeling of futility I felt every time a motion to dismiss for failure
to certify was submitted for one of the cases before me.52

This inefficiency (and countless unjust outcomes) led Congress to
attempt a legislative remedy through the Federal Courts Administration
49. 41 U.S.C. § 7103(b)(1) (2012).
50. 48 C.F.R. § 33.207(c) (2018).
51. See Nash & Cibinic, supra note 44.
52. The Hon. Ruth C. Burg, The Role of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in
Government Contract Disputes: A Historic View from the Bench, 42 PUB. CONT. L.J. 173, 175 (2012).
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Act of 1992,53 which: (1) clarified who could certify a claim, (2)
provided that the contracting officer had no obligation to issue a final
decision on a claim that was not properly certified, and (3) affirmed
that “[a] defect in the certification of a claim shall not deprive a court
or an agency board of contract appeals of jurisdiction over that claim.”54
Just before Congress sent the final bill to President Clinton, Senator
Howell Heflin (its sponsor) explained that the amendment “will
eliminate the confusion and waste of resources that has resulted from
the Contract Disputes Act certification being deemed jurisdictional.”55
The Federal Circuit has not provided a precedential holding as to
whether failure to certify is still a jurisdictional defect after the 1992
amendments; however, it has suggested in dicta and nonprecedential
opinions that failure to certify may not be a jurisdictional issue.56
Nevertheless, and despite the 1992 amendment’s plain language and
legislative intent, the Boards of Contract Appeals and several judges of
the Court of Federal Claims continue to address certification as a
jurisdictional requirement.57 Often citing FAR provisions and
unenacted passages of legislative history, these decisions generally
distinguish between “defective certification” and “failure to certify,”
the latter of which is still treated as a jurisdictional bar.58 They further
limited the scope of correctible “defective certifications” to those that
are “technically defective.”59 Under this line of decisions, a defective
certification could not be remedied (and therefore destroyed
jurisdiction) where “the failure properly to certify in the first instance

53. Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 907, 106
Stat. 4506, 4518 (1992) (codified in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.).
54. Id.
55. See 138 CONG. REC. 34,204 (1992).
56. See M. Maropakis Carpentry, Inc. v. United States, 609 F.3d 1323, 1329 (Fed.
Cir. 2010) (“[W]hile technical compliance with certification is not a jurisdictional
prerequisite to litigation of a contractor’s claim under the CDA, it is a requirement to
the maintenance of such an action.”); J&E Salvage Co. v. United States, No. 97-5066,
1998 WL 133265, at *6 n.4 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 25, 1998) (“Pursuant to the Federal Courts
Administration Act of 1992, proper certification of a CDA claim is no longer a
jurisdictional requirement.”); James M. Ellett Constr. Co. v. United States, 93 F.3d
1537, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“We part ways with the government at its predicate: that
a proper certification of the settlement proposal was a jurisdictional prerequisite.”).
57. See Castellano, supra note 44, at 62–63 & n.192.
58. Id. at 62.
59. Id.
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was fraudulent, in bad faith, or with reckless or grossly negligent
disregard of the requirements of the relevant statutes or regulations.”60
b. Prior proceedings
The DAI Global appeal involved several subcontractor claims
submitted by DAI to the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) contracting officer. DAI submitted the
subcontractor claims under a DAI cover letter that was characterized
as a certification, but the cover letter did not match the FAR’s template
certification language.61 The contracting officer initially notified DAI
on July 10, 2017 that she would issue a decision on the claims by August
24, 2017. However, on “July 19, 2017, 70 days after DAI submitted its
claims, the contracting officer sent a second letter informing DAI that
the submission did not contain a contractor certification.”62
DAI appealed to the Civilian Board of Contracts Appeals. The
government sought dismissal for lack of jurisdiction due to inadequate
certification.63 The Board rejected the argument that DAI’s various
correspondences with USAID qualified as a correctable, technically
defective certification.64 The Board recited the line of decisions holding
that “if the certification is made with intentional, reckless, or negligent
disregard for the applicable certification requirements, it is not
correctable.”65 After comparing the DAI correspondence with USAID to
prior decisions, the Board found that DAI’s claim submission was
“reckless” with respect to certification and “therefore not salvageable.”66
c. The Federal Circuit’s decision
DAI appealed to the Federal Circuit, arguing principally that its
certification was defective, but correctable. More specifically, DAI
argued that the Board deviated from the plain language of the 1992
CDA amendment by relying on unenacted legislative history to impose
60. 138 CONG. REC. 21,033, 21,033 (1992); see Dev. Alternatives, Inc. ex rel. Ersm
(Afg.) Ltd. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., CBCA 5942, CBCA 5943, CBCA 5944, CBCA
5945, CBCA 5946, 18-1 BCA ¶ 37,147.
61. DAI Global, LLC v. Adm’r of the U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 945 F.3d 1196,
1197 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1197–98.
65. Dev. Alternatives, Inc., CBCA 5942, CBCA 5943, CBCA 5944, CBCA 5945, CBCA
5946, 18-1 BCA ¶ 37,147.
66. Id.
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the narrow “technical defect” standard.67 DAI further argued that, in
light of Supreme Court precedent, the certification requirement is not
jurisdictional at all.68
The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded.69 Judge Moore authored
the unanimous precedential opinion, joined by Judges Schall and
Taranto.70 The DAI Global decision squarely rejects the line of decisions
holding that only “technically defective” certification may be corrected:
Contrary to the Board’s statement of the law, there is no statutory
requirement that a defect in a certification be merely “technical” to
be correctable. Nor is there a statutory basis for finding a defective
certification uncorrectable based on “intentional, reckless, or
negligent disregard for the applicable certification requirements.”
In reaching the opposite conclusion, the Board relied on the text of
an unenacted version of the governing statute, which passed only in
the Senate . . . .
The statute, as enacted, mentions only “defective certification[s]”
without reference to the technical nature of the defect or mens rea. It
is axiomatic that a statute should not be read to implicitly include
language specifically rejected by Congress . . . . We hold that
§ 7103(b)(3) does not limit defects to those that are technical in nature
nor does it limit a contractor’s right to correct a defect if the initial
certification was made with “intentional, reckless, or negligent
disregard for the applicable certification requirements.”71

The Federal Circuit did not address the broader issue of whether
certification is a jurisdictional requirement, avoiding any direct
assertion that certification is or is not jurisdictional.
The opinion concludes recognizing that, because the Contracting
Officer admittedly did not issue her decision rejecting the claim for
lack of certification until more than sixty days after the claim was
submitted, the claim was deemed denied and therefore properly
appealable to the Board:
It is undisputed that the contracting officer failed to notify DAI of
the defect within the statutory period. DAI submitted its claims on
May 10, 2017 and did not receive notice of the defect until July 19,

67. See Opening Brief of Appellant at 16, 19, DAI Global, LLC v. Adm’r of the U.S.
Agency for Int’l Dev., CBCA 5942, CBCA 5943, CBCA 5944, CBCA 5945, CBCA 5946,
18-1 BCA ¶ 37,147.
68. See id. at 25–26 (citing Castellano, supra note 44, at 69–72).
69. DAI Global, 945 F.3d at 1197.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1198–99 (internal citations omitted).
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2017, more than 60 days after DAI filed its claim. The contracting
officer was therefore required to issue a decision on DAI’s claims.
But the contracting officer failed to do so. Because the contracting
officer failed to issue a decision within the statutory period, DAI’s
claim was deemed denied and became appealable to the Board.72

d. Implications
It is worth emphasizing that contractors are best advised to closely
abide by all CDA and FAR claim submission requirements. That said,
there is much to be gained from decisions, like DAI Global, that rightly
relax and simplify the CDA’s jurisdictional requirements, which are
often used to justify dismissal of valid claims based on hyper-technical,
nonprejudicial deviations from the CDA and FAR-prescribed procedures.
As the Supreme Court has emphasized, jurisdictional tests should be as
simple and predictable as possible.73 From that perspective, eliminating
the distinction between “technical” and other defects that might arise in
the claim certification process is a step in the right direction for the
long-term success of the CDA as a dispute resolution vehicle.
2.

KBR: More Maropakis malarkey
Secretary of the Army v. Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc. (“KBR”)74 is
part of a long-running dispute regarding the allowability of certain
private security contractor (PSC) costs that KBR incurred during
performance of the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP).75
Despite previously reimbursing PSC costs, the Army changed course,
deemed the costs unallowable, and withheld $44 million from KBR’s
outstanding invoices.76 The dispute traveled through a series of decisions
by the ASBCA and the Federal Circuit, with KBR eventually filing an
amended complaint at ASBCA alleging prior material breach: “KBR ‘is
entitled to judgment because the Army breached its contractual
obligation to provide adequate force protection and the use of PSCs
was a permissible remedy.’”77

72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 1200 (internal citation omitted).
See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 80 (2010).
779 F. App’x 716 (2019).
See generally Ralph C. Nash, Helping the Government: It Can Be Troublesome, 33
NASH & CIBINIC REP. NL ¶ 43, Aug. 2019.
76. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., 779 F. App’x at 717.
77. Id. at 718.
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The Army moved to dismiss this allegation for lack of jurisdiction on
the basis that KBR had not submitted a CDA claim to the contracting
officer alleging prior breach as a basis for relief,78 relying on the
Federal Circuit’s controversial decision in M. Maropakis Carpentry, Inc.
v. United States.79 Maropakis held that where a contractor asserts an
argument seeking adjustment of contract terms or payment, even
when asserted as an affirmative defense to a government claim, the
contractor must first formally submit that argument as a claim to the
contracting officer.80 The Federal Circuit extended Maropakis to
government claims in Raytheon Co. v. United States,81 creating a
jurisdictional bar against affirmative defenses asserted by the
government that seek an adjustment to contract terms but were not
first issued as formal contracting officer final decisions.82
The Board denied the Army’s motion and granted summary
judgment in KBR’s favor.83 With respect to jurisdiction, the Board
applied prior Federal Circuit precedent from Laguna Construction Co.
v. Carter,84 which held that the common law defense of prior material
breach does not need to be presented as a CDA claim.85 Securiforce
International America, LLC v. United States86 extends Laguna to confirm
that a contractor’s common-law affirmative defense of prior material
breach is not subject to the Maropakis rule.87
On the merits, the Board held that the Army’s failure to provide adequate
protection constituted a prior material breach, justifying the PSC costs:
The government does not seriously dispute that it was obligated
under the LOGCAP III contract to provide force protection to
[KBR] and its subcontractors equivalent to that provided to DoD
civilians, and obligated . . . to provide them with force protection
commensurate with the threat. Indeed, it would be unconscionable
to take the position that the contract prohibited [KBR] and its
78. Id.
79. 609 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
80. Id. at 1331. For comprehensive (and highly critical) analysis of Maropakis, see
Steven L. Schooner & Pamela J. Kovacs, Affirmatively Inefficient Jurisprudence?: Confusing
Contractors’ Rights to Raise Affirmative Defenses with Sovereign Immunity, 21 FED. CIR. B.J.
685, 704–06 (2011).
81. 747 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
82. Id. at 1353–55.
83. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs. Inc., ASBCA No. 56358, 17-1 BCA ¶ 36,779.
84. 828 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
85. Id. at 1369–70.
86. 879 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
87. Id. at 1363.
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subcontractors from providing for their own protection, while
performing in a war zone, without otherwise providing for their
security. Yet, despite the many and continuing failures of the
government to provide the promised level of force protection to
[KBR] and its subcontractors summarized above, the government
seeks to disallow the PSC costs incurred . . . in order to accomplish
their mission under the LOGCAP contract despite the government’s
breach, and argues that its breach was not material. It is hard to
imagine a contract breach more material than this one, which
eviscerated the promise at the heart of the justification for the
government’s claim. The government’s breach was material.88

In the words of Professor Nash: “Believe it or not, the Government
appealed this decision.”89 The Army repeated its argument that KBR’s
prior material breach allegations should be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.90 In a nonprecedential, unanimous decision authored by
Judge Stoll and joined by Chief Judge Prost and Judge Lourie, the
Federal Circuit affirmed.91
The Federal Circuit agreed that Laguna controlled, and thus KBR’s
prior material breach claim did not need to be submitted to the
contracting officer as a certified claim.92 Although nonprecedential, the
KBR decision offers helpful guidance through this complex area of law:
Like the contractor in Securiforce and the government in Laguna,
KBR asserts the affirmative defense of prior material breach under
the contract as written. KBR hired PSCs only because the Army first
breached its force protection obligations. So while the LOGCAP III
contract prohibits the use of PSCs, the Army’s prior material breach
excused KBR’s noncompliance with that prohibition. KBR’s options
were to either cease operations or to hire PSCs; it chose the latter so
that it could continue supporting the military. In Laguna, we held
that the Board had jurisdiction over the government’s prior material
breach defense under the contract as written, which the government
asserted to defeat Laguna’s monetary claim. And more recently in
Securiforce, we reiterated that such a defense “is not a claim for
money” and need not be presented to the contracting officer. KBR
asserts the same defense here. KBR’s prior material breach defense

88. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs. Inc., ASBCA No. 56358, 17-1 BCA ¶ 36,779.
89. Nash, supra note 75, at ¶ 43.
90. Sec’y of the Army v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 779 F. App’x 716, 719
(Fed. Cir. 2019).
91. Id. at 717.
92. Id. at 719–21.
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seeks denial of the Army’s monetary claim to over $44 million, and
the Board properly exercised jurisdiction.93

The Federal Circuit found it irrelevant that, due to the posture of
the dispute, KBR was technically seeking to recover funds already in
the government’s possession:
We recognize that the posture of this case differs from Laguna. The
government in Laguna asserted its defense to withhold payment
whereas KBR asserted its defense to recover payment. We
nonetheless conclude that Laguna’s teachings apply here. The
government pays the contractor for services performed, so monies
at issue are necessarily in the hands of the government first. Whether
prior material breach is asserted to eliminate debt as in Laguna, or
to recover withheld payments as here, the effect is the same—the
defense is asserted to defeat a wrongful monetary claim.94

Finally, the Federal Circuit distinguished this case from Maropakis
and Raytheon on the basis that KBR did not seek to adjust the terms of
the contract:
Contrary to what the Army argues, this case is not like Maropakis or
Raytheon because KBR does not seek to adjust the terms of the
contract. The contractor in Maropakis asserted excusable delay as an
affirmative defense and sought a time extension for performance
under the contract. Our conclusion that the Court of Federal Claims
lacked jurisdiction turned on the fact that the contractor was seeking
“an adjustment of contract terms.” Similarly, the government in
Raytheon sought an equitable adjustment to the contract that was less
than the dollar amount demanded by the contractor. Maropakis and
Raytheon are thus distinguishable because the parties in those cases
sought to change the terms of the contract and did not assert prior
material breach as an affirmative defense. As mentioned above, KBR
seeks only a denial of the government’s monetary claim, not a
change to the terms of the contract.95

This opinion’s nonprecedential status should not lull any party into
thinking that the drama of Maropakis is finally settled. The case law
stemming from Maropakis is notoriously complex, and it is still (a decade
later) essentially impossible to predict which defenses do and do not need
to be presented to a contracting officer in the form of a CDA claim.

93. Id. at 721 (internal citations omitted).
94. Id.
95. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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3. HHL: Distinctions between requests for equitable adjustment and certified
claims
Hejran Hejrat Co. v. U.S. Army Corps. of Engineers,96 (“HHL”) addresses
the requirement that, before a Request for Equitable Adjustment
(REA) can qualify as a claim and provide the basis for CDA jurisdiction,
the contractor must request a contracting officer’s decision on the
claim and the contracting officer must issue a decision on that claim.97
Amidst a dispute with the Army Corps of Engineers regarding
contract price adjustments under a contract to provide transportation
services in Afghanistan, Hejran Hejrat Co. LTD (“HHL”) submitted to
the contracting officer a document titled “Request for Equitable
Adjustment,” which requested compensation and stated that the
document should be “treated as an REA.”98 The contracting officer
denied the request in a writing characterized as the “Government’s
final determination in this matter.”99 HHL appealed to the ASBCA, but
the Board dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because, “[a]t no point, in
six years of communication with [the agency], has HHL requested a
contracting officer’s final decision.”100 There was apparently no dispute
that HHL’s REA satisfied any other claim submission requirement.101
In a unanimous opinion authored by Judge Dyk and joined by
Judges Newman and Wallach, the Federal Circuit reversed and
remanded to the Board for further proceedings.102 The Federal Circuit
found that “there was a request for a final decision by a contracting
officer and a final decision entered by the contracting officer . . . .”103
First, the Federal Circuit squarely rejected the government’s
suggestion that there was any jurisdictional significance to HHL styling
its submission as an REA instead of a claim, citing a long line of Federal
Circuit precedent recognizing that REAs may satisfy the claim
submission requirements.104 Second, the Federal Circuit rejected the
notion that HHL’s REA submission did not include language clearly

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

930 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1356.
Id. at 1356–57 (internal quotation and alteration omitted).
Id. at 1356.
Id.
Id. at 1357–58.
Id. at 1356.
Id.
Id. at 1357.
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requesting a contracting officer’s decision, quoting prior precedent
that the Federal Circuit is
loathe to believe that in this case a reasonable contractor would
submit to the contracting officer a letter containing a payment
request after a dispute had arisen solely for the contracting officer’s
information and without at the very least an implied request that the
contracting officer make a decision as to entitlement. Any other
finding offends logic.105

Third, the Federal Circuit rejected the government’s argument that
the HHL REA did not request a contracting officer’s final decision
because prior HHL communications on the issue had expressly stated
that they did not seek a contracting officer’s final decision.106 The Federal
Circuit noted that, while prior correspondence may have expressly stated
that no decision was requested, the ultimate REA did not include any such
disclaimer, and postdated the earlier correspondence by more than a
year.107 On this point, the Federal Circuit also found relevant that the REA
“was sworn unlike earlier submissions, and thus had a formality lacking in
the earlier submissions.”108
C. St. Bernard Parish: Punting the Rick’s Mushroom Problem
St. Bernard Parish Government v. United States109 is significant because
of the important issue the Federal Circuit avoided, leaving the Court
of Federal Claims judges divided as to their jurisdiction over breach of
contract disputes arising under cooperative agreements and other
nonprocurement contracts. This issue grows more important as the
government increasingly relies on nonprocurement contracts like
cooperative agreements and so-called “Other Transactions.”110

105. Id. at 1358 (quoting Transamerica Ins. Corp. v. United States, 973 F.2d 1572,
1578 (Fed. Cir. 1992), overruled in part by Reflectone, Inc. v. Dalton, 60 F.3d 1573, 1579
n.10 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. 916 F.3d 987 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
110. See Nathaniel E. Castellano, “Other Transactions” Are Government Contracts, and Why
It Matters, 48 PUB. CONT. L.J. 485, 486, 490, 499 (2019) (recognizing increased use of “Other
Transactions” in lieu of procurement contracts, providing legal argument that Other
Transactions are contracts with the government, and recognizing the jurisdiction risk
created by Rick’s Mushroom to breach of contract claims arising from Other Transactions).
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1.

Context
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Rick’s Mushroom Service Inc. v. United
States111 creates uncertainty as to whether the Court of Federal Claims
and the Federal Circuit will construe nonprocurement contracts (such
as cooperative agreements and Other Transactions) to satisfy the
“money mandating” requirement for Tucker Act jurisdiction.112 “The
Tucker Act is merely a jurisdictional statute and does not create a
substantive cause of action . . . ” and so, “the plaintiff must look beyond
the Tucker Act to identify a substantive source of law that create[d] the
right to recovery of money damages against the United States.”113 The
Federal Circuit affirmed in Rick’s Mushroom the Court of Federal
Claims’ dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of a plaintiff’s alleged breach
of a cooperative agreement where the parties had agreed to a costsharing arrangement. The opinion reasons that “the cost-share
agreement does not provide a substantive right to recover moneydamages and Rick’s does not point to a money-mandating source of
law to establish jurisdiction”114 This was a departure from the general
rule that money damages are presumed an available and adequate
remedy for breach of contract, and that therefore, a plaintiff need not
identify any additional money mandating source of law when alleging
breach of contract under the Tucker Act.115
Applying Rick’s Mushroom, the Federal Circuit has reached the same
conclusion with respect to the alleged breach of a confidentiality
agreement with the government where there was no indication that a
breach would entitle the plaintiff to money damages.116 Certain Court
of Federal Claims decisions, including the decision on appeal in St.
Bernard Parish, have relied on Rick’s Mushroom to conclude that
nonprocurement contracts, particularly cooperative agreements, are
not entitled to a presumption of money damages.117
111. 521 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
112. Id. at 1343–44. For (critical) analysis, see 3 KAREN L. MANOS, GOVERNMENT
CONTRACT COSTS & PRICING § 90:6 (June 2019 update); Ralph C. Nash, Does the Implied
Warranty of Specifications Attach to Cooperative Agreements?: A Surprising Answer, 22 NO. 12
NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶ 71, Dec. 2008.
113. Rick’s Mushroom Serv., Inc., 521 F.3d at 1343.
114. Id.
115. See LaBatte v. United States, 899 F.3d 1373, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (compiling cases).
116. See Higbie v. United States, 778 F.3d 990 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
117. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States, 134 Fed. Cl. 730, 734–35 (2017), aff’d
on other grounds, 916 F.3d 987 (Fed. Cir. 2019); see also Anchorage v. United States, 119
Fed. Cl. 709, 713 (2015).
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Yet, several Federal Circuit decisions have rejected government
attempts to apply Rick’s Mushroom beyond the unique facts of that case,
reaffirming the general presumption of money damages arising from
a breach of contract—at least in the context of settlement
agreements.118 And, at least one judge on the Court of Federal Claims
has distinguished Rick’s Mushroom to find jurisdiction over alleged
breach of cooperative agreement claims.119 While the appeal in St.
Bernard Parish offered an opportunity to address this jurisdictional
confusion, the Federal Circuit decided the case on other grounds.
2.

The Federal Circuit’s decision
St. Bernard Parish involved a cooperative agreement between the
Parish and the Emergency Watershed Protection Program office of the
U.S. Department of Agriculture, which required the Parish to install
emergency watershed protection measures to relieve hazards created
by Hurricane Katrina at a cost not to exceed a fixed amount.120 After
performance, a dispute arose as to the amount the government would
pay, and the Parish sued for breach of contract in the Court of Federal
Claims.121 Following Rick’s Mushroom, Court of Federal Claims Judge
Damich concluded that the court lacked jurisdiction over a breach of
contract claim arising from a cooperative agreement.122
The Parish appealed. In a unanimous opinion authored by Judge
Bryson and joined by Judges Lourie and Wallach, the Federal Circuit
agreed that the Court of Federal Claims lacked jurisdiction, but
avoided entirely the Rick’s Mushroom issue.123 Instead, the Federal
118. See LaBatte, 899 F.3d at 1378–79 (finding jurisdiction over breach of settlement
agreement); Rocky Mountain Helium LLC v. United States, 841 F.3d 1320, 1326–27
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding jurisdiction over breach of settlement agreement); Holmes
v. United States, 657 F.3d 1303, 1311–12, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (finding jurisdiction
over settlement agreement based on nexus to future employment).
119. See San Antonio Hous. Auth. v. United States, 143 Fed. Cl. 425, 463–64 (2019).
120. St. Bernard Par., 134 Fed. Cl. at 732–34 (2017).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 734–35. Curiously, the Court of Federal Claims also concluded that it
lacked jurisdiction due to lack of consideration on the basis that the contract did not
“direct[ly] benefit” the government. Id. at 735–36. While it is true that cooperative
agreements entail the government paying a private party to provide a benefit to a third
party, it is not obvious why the government does not receive consideration when it enters
into such a contract, i.e., it promises compensation in return for the consideration of the
contractor delivering the promised benefit to the third party. See Ralph C. Nash,
Cooperative Agreements: A Possible Remedy, 33 NASH & CIBINIC REP. NL ¶ 16, Mar. 2019.
123. St. Bernard Pari., 916 F.3d at 991–98.
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Circuit reasoned that the particular program through which the
cooperative agreement was established was created under a statutory
authority that provided for district court jurisdiction over agency
action under the program.124 While that holding may provide an
answer to some cooperative agreement disputes, it leaves considerable
uncertainty—and clear disagreement among the Court of Federal
Claims judges—regarding Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction over
breach of contract allegations arising from cooperative agreements
and other nonprocurement contracts.
D. Significant Decisions With (Curious) Nonprecedential Designation
Curiously, three of the Federal Circuit’s most significant 2019
procurement decisions were designated as nonprecedential. The first,
KBR (discussed above in the context of CDA jurisdiction) provided
helpful analysis of the notoriously complex Maropakis line of decisions.
Next, in American Relocation Connections, L.L.C. v. United States,125 a
panel of three of the Federal Circuit’s most recently appointed judges
provided useful (but nonprecedential) analysis of the prejudice
requirement in bid protests.126 Finally, in Safeguard Base Operations, LLC
v. United States,127 the Federal Circuit dismissed as moot an appeal that
many in the procurement community hoped would be used to bring
clarity to the standards that the Court of Federal Claims judges apply
to Competition In Contracting Act (CICA) override challenges.128
The Federal Circuit’s Rules and Internal Operating Procedures
(IOPs) address the significance of nonprecedential designation.
Pursuant to Federal Circuit Rule 32.1, parties “are not prohibited or
restricted from citing nonprecedential dispositions issued after
January 1, 2007,” and the “court may refer to a nonprecedential
decision in an opinion or order and may look to a nonprecedential
disposition for guidance or persuasive reasoning, but will not give one
of its own nonprecedential dispositions the effect of binding
precedent.”129 Nonprecedential designation can serve to effectively
insulate a decision from en banc rehearing, as the Practice Notes to
Federal Circuit Rule 35 warn that a “petition for rehearing en banc is
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 992, 997–98.
789 F. App’x 221 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
Id.
792 F. App’x 945 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
Id.
Fed. Cir. R. 32.1(c)–(d).
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rarely appropriate if the appeal was the subject of a nonprecedential
opinion by the panel of judges that heard it.”130 Federal Circuit Rule
32.1 does, however, provide a window of opportunity to petition that a
nonprecedential opinion be redesignated as precedential.131
IOP Number 10, provides the official justification for precedential
and nonprecedential designations:
2. The purpose of a precedential disposition is to inform the bar and
interested persons other than the parties. The parties can be sufficiently
informed of the court’s reasoning in a nonprecedential opinion.
3. Disposition by nonprecedential opinion or order does not mean
the case is considered unimportant, but only that a precedential
opinion would not add significantly to the body of law or would
otherwise fail to meet a criterion in paragraph 4.132

IOP 10, Paragraph 4, lists circumstances that warrant precedential
designation, including where an “issue of first impression is treated”;
an “existing rule of law is criticized, clarified, altered, or modified”; an
“existing rule of law is applied to facts significantly different from those
to which that rule has previously been applied”; a “legal issue of
substantial public interest, which the court has not sufficiently treated
recently, is resolved”; and a “previously overlooked rule of law is
treated.”133 Suffice it to say, the Author encounters some difficulty
reconciling this list of justifications for precedential designation with
the nonprecedential designations assigned to KBR, American Relocation
Services, and SBO. Each case seems to satisfy at least one if not several
of the IOP 10 criteria.
1.

American Relocation Services: A fresh take on prejudice
American Relocation Services provides a refreshing and useful perspective
for the bid protest prejudice requirement.
a. Context for prejudice & the “substantial chance” standard
The Federal Circuit and its predecessors (like the Government
Accountability Office (GAO)) have long recognized that in order to
succeed, a protester must show not only an error in the procurement
process, but also that the protester suffered some prejudice as a result
130. Fed. Cir. R. 35 (Practice Notes).
131. Fed. Cir. R. 32.1(e).
132. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
OPERATING PROCEDURES, supra note 43, No. 10.
133. Id.

THE

FEDERAL CIRCUIT INTERNAL
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of that error. In the context of a post-award protest, the prejudice
requirement is satisfied if the protester can demonstrate a “substantial
chance” of receiving an award but for the procurement error.134
The rationale for this substantial chance test was explored in Morgan
Business Associates v. United States.135 The Court of Claims rejected the
protester’s argument that any violation of procurement law
necessitates a remedy, and also rejected the government’s argument that
a protester is only entitled to a remedy if the protester can prove it would
have received the contract but for the error.136 Striking a middle ground,
the Court of Claims reasoned that a protester need only demonstrate a
“substantial chance” of success but for the agency error:
We reject, however, plaintiff’s proposition that any breach of the
duty to give consideration creates an immediate entitlement to bid
preparation costs. Morgan emphasizes that failure to consider its
proposal was a violation of statute and procurement regulations, but
we have said that “proven violation of pertinent statutes or
regulations can, but need not necessarily, be a ground for recovery.”
Acceptance of plaintiff’s theory would make the Government an
insurer for a party’s bid preparation expenses whenever a bid or
proposal is lost. This could lead to the far-fetched result that the
Government might be responsible for paying bid preparation costs
for a proposal that is wholly inadequate on its face, one which would
be summarily rejected after even a single reading, or one which has
no real chance of acceptance. Bid preparation expenses are a cost of
doing business that are “lost” whenever the bidder fails to receive a
contract. We cannot assume that a plaintiff has always and necessarily
been damaged by the Government’s failure to consider its proposal—
but that is the end- result of the rule Morgan puts forward.
Conversely, we are not persuaded by the Government’s
argument that plaintiff must show that, but for the failure to
consider its proposal, it would have received a contract. . . . [I]t
would be virtually impossible for the plaintiff to make a “but for”
showing. . . .
We hold, rather, that when the Government completely fails to
consider a plaintiff’s bid or proposal, the plaintiff may recover its bid
preparation costs if, under all the facts and circumstances, it is
established that, if the bid or proposal had been considered, there
was a substantial chance that the plaintiff would receive an award—
134. Statistica, Inc. v. Christopher, 102 F.3d 1577, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (quoting
CACI, Inc.-Fed. v. United States, 719 F.2d 1567, 1574–75 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
135. 619 F.2d 892 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
136. Id. at 895.
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that it was within the zone of active consideration. If there was no
substantial chance that plaintiff’s proposal would lead to an award,
then the Government’s breach of duty did not damage plaintiff. In
that situation a plaintiff cannot rightfully recover its bid preparation
expenses. This principle of liability vindicates the bidder’s interest and
right in having his bid considered while at the same time forestalling
a windfall recovery for a bidder who was not in reality damaged.137

Although subsequent opinions from different judges and different
tribunals later employed slightly different formulations of the
substantial chance test, the Federal Circuit confirmed in Statistica, Inc.
v. Christopher138 that all of these variations ultimately require that “a
protester must demonstrate that but for the alleged error, there was a
‘substantial chance that [it] would receive an award—that it was within
the zone of active consideration.’”139 While the phrases “substantial
chance” and “zone of active consideration” were settled by Statistica, they
have limited utility. The Court of Federal Claims is left with little practical
guidance on where to draw the line between (1) prejudicial error that
necessitates remand for further consideration (or other remedy) and (2)
nonprejudicial error that does not warrant sustaining a protest.
b. American Relocation Services: Framing protester prejudice
through the APA
In American Relocation Services, Judge Hughes authored a nonprecedential
decision joined by Judges Reyna and Chen—three of the court’s most
recent appointees140—that recited the generic rule for prejudice but then
added a new gloss, emphasizing that the bid protest prejudice requirement
is rooted in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) itself:
We review bid protest cases according to the standards in 5 U.S.C.
§ 706. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(4). Section 706 instructs courts that “due
account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.” 5 U.S.C.
§ 706. That rule calls on courts to apply the “same kind of ‘harmlesserror’ rule that courts ordinarily apply in civil cases.” See Shinseki v.
Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 406 (2009) (discussing identical language in
38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(2) and noting that “Congress intended [that

137. Id. at 895–96 (internal footnotes and citations omitted).
138. 102 F.3d 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
139. Id. at 1581 (alteration in original) (quoting CACI, Inc.-Fed. v. United States,
719 F.2d 1567, 1574–75 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
140. Seven of the Federal Circuit’s active judges were appointed during the Obama
administration in a period spanning from 2010 through 2015. See Judges, U.S. CT. APPEALS
FOR FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges [https://perma.cc/ HK4K-AQDE].

2020]

2019 GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS LAW DECISIONS

1291

statute] . . . to ‘incorporate a reference’ to the APA’s approach”).
Similarly, the federal harmless error statute instructs courts to
disregard “errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights
of the parties.” 28 U.S.C. § 2111. “The correction of an error must
yield a different result in order for that error to have been harmful
and thus prejudice a substantial right of a party.” Munoz v. Strahm
Farms, Inc., 69 F.3d 501, 504 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Thus, to prevail in its
bid protest, ARC must “show a significant, prejudicial error in the
procurement process,” meaning it must show that there is a greaterthan-insignificant chance that CBP would have issued the 2018 RFQ
as a set-aside for small businesses had it not committed the alleged
errors. Alfa Laval Separation, Inc., 175 F.3d at 1367.141

The citations to Shinseki v. Sanders,142 the APA’s “harmless error”
provision, and the federal “harmless error” statute are all
noteworthy.143 In Sanders, the Supreme Court agreed that the Federal
Circuit erred by effectively applying a presumption of prejudice in
veterans benefits cases, as opposed to applying the case-by-case analysis
generally required to assess harmless error under the APA and federal
harmless error statute.144 American Relocation seems to suggest that the
bid protest prejudice requirement must be applied based on
consideration of the basic principles of APA review. This is consistent
with the Court of Federal Claims’ modern source of bid protest
jurisdiction, which expressly provides for APA review.145
On one hand, the American Relocation analysis (like the Sanders
decision) can be read in some cases to strengthen the prejudice
requirement, permitting the Court of Federal Claims relatively broad
authority (if not responsibility) to deny a protest where it is clear from
the record that the protester would not have a substantial chance of
receiving award, notwithstanding the alleged procurement error. On
the other hand, the American Relocation analysis, if extended to its
logical end, also reveals the limit of the Court of Federal Claims’
authority to disregard a procurement error as nonprejudicial. In the
context of APA review, the harmless error rule is counterbalanced by

141. Am. Relocation Connections, L.L.C. v. United States, 789 F. App’x 221, 228
(Fed. Cir. 2019).
142. 556 U.S. 396 (2009).
143. Judge Hughes served as counsel for the United States in Sanders, in his prior
capacity as a Department of Justice attorney. Id. at 399.
144. Id. at 406–09, 412–13 (“In Sanders’ case, the Veterans Court found the notice
error harmless. And after reviewing the record, we conclude that finding is lawful.”).
145. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(4) (2012); see also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
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another fundamental tenet of APA review, referred to as the Chenery
doctrine.146 Under this doctrine, reviewing courts “may not supply a
reasoned basis for the agency’s action that the agency itself has not
given” and “must judge the propriety of such action solely by the
grounds invoked by the agency.”147
Although not precedential, the American Relocation Services analysis—
if properly extended to incorporate the Chenery doctrine as well as the
harmless error rule—offers a useful framework to analyze bid protest
prejudice issues. In some cases, like American Relocation, the record will
make plain that the protester has no substantial chance of receiving
award even if an alleged procurement error were remedied. In others,
however, remedying the procurement error would necessarily change
the evidence before the agency official vested with discretion to make
the decision at issue.148 In such cases, the Chenery doctrine would seem
to prevent the court from assuming the role of the agency
decisionmaker and deciding whether the protester would have a
substantial chance of award under the new circumstances.
To be sure, there will not always be a clear line between cases where
the rule of harmless error governs and those where the Chenery
doctrine requires remand for a new first-instance decision. However,
using the lens of the APA’s harmless error rule and the Chenery
doctrine frames the prejudice question in more functional terms of
administrative law, rooted in Supreme Court precedent with
potentially persuasive authority generated from decades of APA

146. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943); see also Braniff Airways, Inc. v.
Civil Aeronautics Bd., 379 F.2d 453, 465–66 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (“Of course an error
cannot be dismissed as ‘harmless’ without taking into account the limited ability of a
court to assume as a judicial function, even for the purpose of affirmance, the
distinctive discretion assigned to the agency.” (citing Chenery, 332 U.S. at 196)); 33
WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 8394 (2d ed., Aug. 2019
Update) (discussing the balance between the harmless error rule affirmed in Sanders
and the Chenery doctrine).
147. Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285–86 (1974).
148. See, e.g., Centerra Grp., LLC v. United States, 138 Fed. Cl. 407, 421 (2018)
(“The prejudice analysis in these circumstances acknowledges that a substantial
chance of award to the protester exists even if the precise contours of the but-for world
cannot be discerned.”); Patricio Enters., Inc., B-412740 et al., 2016 CPD ¶ 152 (Comp.
Gen. May 26, 2016) (“[W]e have no basis—and we decline the agency’s invitation—to
speculate about how the SSA would have viewed the relative merits of . . . proposals in
light of a new, reasonable . . . evaluation; we cannot conclude that the agency’s source
selection decision would not have proceeded differently . . . .”).
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litigation in U.S. district courts and courts of appeal.149 Nor would
employing these APA doctrines require discarding the longstanding
Federal Circuit and Court of Federal Claims precedent applying the
“substantial chance” standard. Rather, the harmless error rule and Chenery
principle serve to help the Court of Federal Claims apply the substantial
chance test: to discern between a protester with a substantial chance and
a protester with an insubstantial chance and to distinguish between those
within the zone of active consideration from those without.
2.

SBO: The Future of CICA Override Challenges
The third and final of the Federal Circuit’s significant
nonprecedential procurement decisions was Safeguard Base Operations,
L.L.C. v. United States (“SBO”).150 Many in the procurement community
anticipated the SBO decision as the Federal Circuit’s long-awaited
opportunity to provide clarity and consistency to the standards that
Court of Federal Claims judges apply when reviewing an agency
decision to override the automatic CICA stay in response to a GAO
protest.151 Instead of reaching the merits, however, the Federal Circuit
dismissed the appeal as moot in a nonprecedential decision.152
Notwithstanding the nonprecedential dismissal, there is much to learn
from the case as to the likely future of CICA override challenges.
a. Context for CICA override challenges
CICA override challenges are a special flavor of bid protest litigation.
One of the most significant features of CICA is the automatic stay.
Assuming compliance with strict timeliness requirements, once GAO
notifies an agency of a pre-award protest, the Agency may not make
award until GAO resolves the protest.153 In the context of a post-award
protest, the Agency must automatically stay performance of the
protested contract award until the GAO protest is resolved.154 The
potential impact of this stay on agency operations is limited by CICA’s

149. See generally Rationalizing Hard Look Review After the Fact, Note, 122 HARV. L. REV.
1909 (2009).
150. 792 F. App’x 945 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
151. See Daniel Seiden, Feds May Be Real Winners if Appeal Helps ‘Confused’ Contractors,
BLOOMBERG L. (Nov. 4, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/federal-contracting/fedsmay-be-real-winners-if-appeal-helps-confused-contractors [https://perma.cc/RH8Z-7JDA].
152. SBO, 792 F. App’x 945 at 946, 948.
153. 31 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1) (2012).
154. § 3553(d)(3)(A).
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requirement that GAO must issue its decision within 100 days from the
date the protest is filed.155 Absent the automatic stay, successful
protesters would often be denied a meaningful remedy unless they
obtained a preliminary injunction from the Court of Federal Claims.156
CICA provides that agencies may, in narrow circumstances, override
the automatic stay and proceed with a procurement as the GAO protest
process unfolds. For both pre- and post-award protests, override may
be justified by “a written finding that urgent and compelling
circumstances which significantly affect interests of the United States
will not permit waiting for the decision.”157 For post-award protests, an
additional basis for overriding the CICA stay exists where “performance
of the contract is in the best interests of the United States.”158 These are
referred to as the “best interests” and “urgent and compelling” standards
for CICA stay overrides.159 The override decision is documented in a
written Determination & Findings (D&F).160
Other than stating these authorities for overriding a CICA stay,
neither CICA nor the FAR give agencies meaningful guidance on the
standards to consider when drafting a D&F to support a CICA override.161
The primary guidance comes from Court of Federal Claims decisions.
The Federal Circuit confirmed in RAMCOR Services Group, Inc. v.
United States162 that the Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction to
decide a protester’s challenge to an override decision.163 Following
RAMCOR, the Court of Federal Claims developed a complex and often
conflicting body of case law addressing the legal standards used to
review an override decision. The most prominent of these opinions
came in 2006 from Reilly’s Wholesale Produce v. United States.164
The Reilly’s opinion explained that, while “override decisions are, by
nature, fact specific, it is possible to distill from the relevant cases a
variety of factors that an agency must consider in making an override
155. § 3554(a)(1).
156. See, e.g., James W. Nelson, GAO-COCF Concurrent Bid Protest Jurisdiction: Are Two
Fora Too Many?, 43 PUB. CONT. L.J. 587, 612 (2014).
157. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3553(c)(2)(A), 3553(d)(3)(C)(i)(I).
158. 31 U.S.C. § 3553(d)(3)(C).
159. See Kevin J. Wilkinson & John M. Page, CICA Stays Revisited: Keys to Successful
Overrides, 66 A.F. L. REV. 135, 136 (2010).
160. Id. at 139 n.19.
161. See 33 C.F.R. § 33.104 (2018).
162. 185 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
163. Id. at 1290–91.
164. 73 Fed. Cl. 705 (2006).
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decision based upon urgent and compelling circumstances”165 The
Reilly’s decision then identifies four factors for consideration:
(i) whether significant adverse consequences will necessarily occur
if the stay is not overridden; (ii) conversely, whether reasonable
alternatives to the override exist that would adequately address the
circumstances presented; (iii) how the potential cost of proceeding
with the override, including the costs associated with the potential that
the GAO might sustain the protest, compare to the benefits associated
with the approach being considered for addressing the agency’s
needs; and (iv) the impact of the override on competition and the
integrity of the procurement system, as reflected in the [CICA].166

While almost any CICA override challenge will likely address Reilly’s
to some extent, the Court of Federal Claims judges are divided on
many critical aspects of how those factors should be applied, if at all.167
Some decisions hold that an agency’s failure to fully consider and
address even one of the Reilly’s factors is arbitrary.168 Some reject Reilly’s
altogether, finding that the only appropriate standard is the APA’s
general arbitrary and capricious standard of review and declining to
require agencies to address any specific element in the override
D&F.169 Others engage with the Reilly’s analysis but decide the case
more broadly in terms of the general APA standard.170 The decisions
are also divided as to whether the Reilly’s factors are limited to overrides
invoking “urgent and compelling” circumstances or whether they
extend to overrides that invoke a “best interests” justification.171 Finally,
the decisions are divided as to whether a plaintiff has to separately

165. Id. at 711.
166. Id. (internal citations and footnote omitted).
167. Several articles from agency counsel and the private bar highlight and attempt
to grapple with the consequences of this evolving and conflicting body of case law. See,
e.g., Cameron S. Hamrick & Michelle E. Litteken, CICA Stay Overrides at the Court of
Federal Claims: What Government Contractors Need to Know, 43 PUB. CONT. L.J. 687, 693–
702 (2014); Kevin J. Wilkinson & Dennis C. Ehlers, Ensuring CICA Stay Overrides Are
Reasonable, Supportable, and Less Vulnerable to Attack: Practical Recommendations in Light of
Recent COFC Cases, 60 A.F. L. REV. 91 (2007); Wilkinson & Page, supra note 159, at 138–
42.
168. See Nortel Gov’t Sols., Inc. v. United States, 84 Fed. Cl. 243, 247–48 (2008).
169. See Dyncorp Int’l LLC v. United States, 113 Fed. Cl. 298, 302 & n.4 (2013); Frontline
Healthcare Workers Safety Found., Ltd. v. United States, No. 10-17C, 2010 WL 637790 (Fed.
Cl. Feb. 4, 2010); PlanetSpace Inc. v. United States, 86 Fed. Cl. 566, 567–68 (2009).
170. See The Analysis Grp., LLC v. United States, No. 09-542C, 2009 WL 3747171, at
*2–3 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 5, 2009).
171. See PMTech, Inc. v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl. 330, 344–45 (2010).
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prove entitlement to injunctive relief in order to overturn the stay, or
whether defeating the override under the Reilly’s test is adequate to
restore the stay.172
This conflicting body of case law leaves agencies and protesters in a
tough position. It is difficult (if not impossible) to anticipate what
standards will apply in an override challenge, at least until a Court of
Federal Claims judge is assigned to the case. Even then, not every judge
will have published a definitive position on each issue relevant to a
CICA override challenge. This often requires that parties to override
litigation must brief their (likely expedited) case against multiple
alternative standards. As Professor Schooner noted in 2012:
We would prefer to see the Court of Federal Claims inject certainty
and consistency into the procurement process. And we share the
frustration of those who complain that, all too often, the luck of the
draw at the Court of Federal Claims significantly affects a case’s
outcome. Absent intervention by the Federal Circuit, however, the lack
of clarity surrounding the relevant standard will persist. This is
particularly problematic to the extent that nothing in FAR 33.104(c) or
(d) prepares a [Contracting Officer or a Head of Contracting Activity]
for the requirements currently being imposed by the reviewing court.173

With this context, it is not surprising that many in the procurement
community have long anticipated that the Federal Circuit would weigh
in and add some clarity.
b. The SBO protest, appeal, & dismissal
Safeguard Base Operations, LLC filed a protest at GAO in
September 2018, challenging a Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) contract award.174 DHS overrode the CICA stay, and Safeguard
filed suit in October 2018 at the Court of Federal Claims seeking a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction setting aside
the CICA stay override.175 By the end of October 2018, the Court of

172. See, e.g., Supreme Foodservice GmbH v. United States, 109 Fed. Cl. 369, 396–
97 (2013); Superior Helicopter LLC v. United States, 78 Fed. Cl. 181, 194 (2007);
Reilly’s Wholesale Produce v. United States, 73 Fed. Cl. 705, 708–09 n.7 (2006).
173. See Steven L. Schooner, Postscript III: Challenging an Override of a Protest Stay, 26
NO. 5 NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶ 25 (May 2012).
174. See Safeguard Base Operations, LLC v. United States, 792 F. App’x 945, 946
(Fed. Cir. 2019).
175. Id. at 946–47.
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Federal Claims denied Safeguard’s motions.176 By decision issued
December 14, 2018, GAO denied Safeguard’s protest.177
Safeguard appealed, arguing that the Court of Federal Claims
should have strictly applied the Reilly’s factors.178 Almost a full year after
GAO denied Safeguard’s initial protest, on December 13, 2019, the
Federal Circuit dismissed Safeguard’s appeal as moot in a
nonprecedential decision.179 Judge Lourie authored the unanimous
decision, joined by Judges Moore and Chen.180
The panel agreed with the Government and the awardee that
“Safeguard’s appeal is now moot because the GAO has denied its bid
protest, and that decision would have terminated the CICA stay even
in the absence of DHS’s override.”181 The panel rejected Safeguard’s
argument that deciding the CICA override issues could impact
Safeguard’s separate appeal from the Court of Federal Claim’s
decision denying the merits of Safeguard’s protest.182 The panel also
rejected the argument that Safeguard’s appeal qualified for the narrow
mootness exception for issues “capable of repetition, yet evading
review.”183 Rejecting Safeguard’s attempted analogy to the Supreme
Court’s mootness analysis in Kingdomware Technologies, Inc. v. United
States,184 the panel described the attenuated chain of events that would
need to occur for Safeguard’s CICA override challenge to repeat itself:
[W]e conclude that Safeguard has not demonstrated a controversy
“capable of repetition, yet evading review.” This exception is
applicable “‘only in exceptional situations,’ where (1) ‘the
challenged action [is] in its duration too short to be fully litigated
prior to cessation or expiration,’ and (2) ‘there [is] a reasonable
expectation that the same complaining party [will] be subject to the
same action again.’”185
A comparison with Kingdomware is illustrative. There, the
Supreme Court held that the petitioner, a bid protester that had bid
on a Department of Veterans Affairs contract since performed,

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. at 947.
Id. at 947 n.1.
Id. at 948.
Id. at 949.
Id. at 946.
Id. at 947.
See id. at 948.
Id.
136 S. Ct. 1969 (2016).
Id. at 1976.
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presented a controversy evading review when it argued that it was
deprived of the contract because the VA misinterpreted 38 U.S.C.
§ 8127(d) (mandating use of the “Rule of Two”) to not apply to
certain contracts. While the contract at issue had already been
performed, the Court reasoned that the case was not moot because
the time period of performance was “too short to complete judicial
review,” and “it [was] reasonable to expect that the [VA] [would]
refuse to apply the Rule of Two” in the future and that
Kingdomware, as a frequent contractor, would be reasonably likely
to win a contract in the future if its view of the statute prevailed.
. . . Safeguard—which has never received a federal
contract[186]—would have to submit another unsuccessful bid, file a
GAO protest, and suffer another CICA stay override. Moreover,
Safeguard would have to show that the CICA stay override occurred
because the agency was not required to justify its decision in light of
the Reilly’s factors.187

The decision couches its holding on the panel’s finding that:
“Safeguard has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it will be subject
to the same action again, and thus it has not presented an exceptional
situation justifying invocation of the ‘capable of repetition yet evading
review’ exception to mootness.”188
Although nonprecedential, the SBO decision does speak to the
standard of review applicable to CICA override challenges. Specifically,
the panel decision includes language that seems to cast doubt on the
idea that agencies must address the Reilly’s factors to justify an override,
or that the Court of Federal Claims must apply the Reilly’s framework.189
Instead, the SBO opinion seems to reaffirm that the Court of Federal
Claims reviews protests through the APA’s general arbitrary and
capricious standard.190 In doing so, the decision cites Federal Circuit
precedent for the proposition that Court of Federal Claims decisions
are not binding in future Court of Federal Claims cases.191 It also cites
the Federal Circuit’s recent decision in Dell Federal Systems v. United
States,192 which rejected the Court of Federal Claims’ application of a

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

As discussed at length during the oral argument, the protester was a joint venture.
SBO, 792 F. App’x at 948 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 949.
Id. at 948–49.
Id.
Id. at 948.
906 F.3d 982 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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heightened “narrow targeting” standard when reviewing corrective
action protests:
We note that the Reilly’s factors do not even bind the Claims Court,
AINS, Inc. v. United States, 365 F.3d 1333, 1336 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2004),
abrogated on other grounds by Slattery v. United States, 635 F.3d 1298
(Fed. Cir. 2011), let alone comprise an indispensable aspect of an
agency rational basis. Cf. Dell Fed. Sys., L.P. v. United States, 906 F.3d
982, 992 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that “highly deferential” rational
basis test governed Claims Court review of agency action for
purposes of deciding injunctive relief in protest of bid
reopening).193

c. Implications
SBO implicitly suggests that the Federal Circuit may never decide the
merits of an appeal from a Court of Federal Claims’ override decision.
Although perhaps conceivable through some series of emergency
and/or interlocutory motions for stay pending appeal, expedited
proceedings, petition for writ of mandamus, etc., it is difficult to
conceive of a realistic circumstance where the Federal Circuit could
receive full briefing and decide an appeal of a Court of Federal Claims’
decision in a CICA override challenge before the 100-day GAO protest
deadline expires. As noted, the Federal Circuit’s opinion in SBO came
almost a full year after GAO denied Safeguard’s protest. Even that
outcome was relatively quick, as the Federal Circuit’s own statistics
reflect that the median time for deciding an appeal reached fifteen
months in Fiscal Year 2019.194 That being said, because SBO is designated
as nonprecedential and rests on somewhat fact-specific mootness
findings, a future panel could disagree with or distinguish the SBO
decision and find that the appeal of a CICA override challenge does pass
the mootness bar, perhaps as capable of repetition yet evading review.
Assuming the Federal Circuit does not provide binding guidance to
clarify the standards that apply to CICA override challenges, the
default rule seems to be that any given override challenge will be
decided largely at the discretion of the assigned Court of Federal
Claims judge. As discussed above, many of those judges have expressed

193. SBO, 792 F. App’x at 948–49.
194. Median Disposition Time Cases Decided by Merits Panels, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FED.
CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/the-court/statistics/06_ Med_
Disp_Time_Chart_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/6JFB-F894].
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differing views on important issues relevant to CICA overrides.195
Accordingly, the safest practice for practitioners (agency counsel and
the private bar) is often to take a conservative approach and cover all
bases when preparing a D&F or motions for temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction.196 That may require addressing
alternative standards for several issues, particularly if the assigned
judge has not issued a definitive position on any given CICA override
issue. And, notwithstanding what any Court of Federal Claims judge
has decided in the past, parties should be prepared to grapple with the
SBO panel’s commentary regarding the nonbinding nature of Reilly’s
and the significance of the Dell Federal Systems decision.
At bottom, SBO may not have been the precedential guidance that
some in the procurement community hoped would finally unify and
clarify the standards applicable to CICA override challenges. The
decision, however, does offer several important insights regarding the
future of CICA override challenges.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit continued to play a significant role in shaping
procurement law in 2019. It remains important for practitioners to
keep a watchful eye on the Federal Circuit’s docket and carefully read
its decisions. The Author has no doubt that will remain just as good
advice in the 2020s as it was in the 2010s.

195. See supra notes 163–71 and accompanying text.
196. See Wilkinson & Page, supra note 159, at 154 (“The Court of Federal Claims
jurisprudence in CICA stay override cases remains unsettled. The prudent approach
in deciding whether to override a stay would be to (1) start with the four APA factors,
(2) because the ‘Reilly’s factors’ still linger, agencies must consider them, and, (3)
because the courts are mixed on whether injunctive relief or declaratory relief is
necessary, agencies have to consider that the court will apply the four factors for
injunctive relief. Nothing short of such a comprehensive analysis will do.”).

